SWH implies that, in particular, in Chinese and English cultures thinking’s are different. There is evidence supporting the claim, up to cases when modus ponens is not a part of cultural tradition. Considering ‘meaning’ of a message as its conceptual and emotional contents, author observes similar difference in emotional expressive power of a language. Again, I would rather agree with the statement. Once I watched a speech of then Russian president Boris Eltsin with simultaneous English interpretation. Despite absolutely ‘conceptual’ accuracy, the ‘meaning’ of the original and translation was absolutely different, sometimes just opposite.  I would assume that the whole range of human emotions is expressible in all languages (of the same cultural level) and languages are differ in ‘scaling’ these emotions: in some languages grammar and vocal differences are much larger that in others – for emotional variations in a sentence. This implies variations in ability of emotion recognition. English humor is, probably, quite good example of the effect. I would like to see this paper becomes widely known as a starting pint of an exciting discussion. 

 Linguistics, Computer Linguistics, Mathematical Logic, AI, Social Choice Theory, Psychology

Perlovsky’s paper is an intellectually challenging attempt not only to rethink what is known as “Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis” (SWH) but also to scale it up to the cultural level through integrative and computational models. I would like to open my review first by criticizing some of the paper’s arguments and then to point to what I consider the paper’s major promise.

SWN is introduced by Perlovsky as the “idea that the way people think is influenced by the language they speak”. However, Sapir and Whorf have never proposed such “hypothesis” and not even an argument concerning some kind of a simple Newtonian influence of “language” on “thought”. This point has been clearly presented by Penny Lee in her analysis of Whorf theory. The point is that thinking as our ability to identify patterns/Gestalts of experience cannot be simply demarcated from our symbolic ability epitomized by natural language. In this sense, and like the Borromean rings, mind and language cannot be simply demarcated. This point has been emphasized by Vygotsky and Luria who argue that the mind is the synergetic and emerging product of three threads in which one of them is the cultural-symbolic. Following this line of reasoning the human mind as a complex evolutionary cultural process is a synergetic product and as such should be studied. This is not only Whorf’s thesis but a point shared by other great thinkers such as Vygotsky, Luria and Voloshinov. Perlovsku in fact doesn’t have to adhere to the SWH in its simple causal version as his paper presents complex synergetic models of cognition.

My second critique concerns the reduction of emotion to the grammar of language. The argument that “changes in language sounds are controlled by grammar” is not well-grounded. “In fact, at this point the argument slips into speculation: 1. most inflections disappeared in English, 2. English language spread democracy, science and technology, 3. this has been made possible by conceptual differentiation empowered by language which overtook emotional synthesis. Reducing the hegemony of the English speaking cultures to changes in inflection is a problematic step. A Semitic language used by a very small group of people – Hebrew – is associated with some of the great minds of the world: Einstein, Freud, and Vygotsky to name few. Can the disproportional number of Nobel laureates from a Jewish origin be attributed to the grammar of Hebrew? The answer is No as can be clearly see from the fact that another Semitic language – Arabic – is not associated with such a success. Again the reductionist thesis of cultural superiority to “grammar” seems diagrammatically opposed to the complex model presented by Perslovsky in which top and bottom up processes mutually constitute each other.

Given the above criticism, what is the promise in the paper? I see the major promise in a 3D model of the human mind that involves three vectors: Conceptual, linguistic and emotional. The “complexity” of a culture can then be measured through the number of different objects/concepts identified by the culture, the number of different signs used to denote conceptual entities (e.g. synonyms, hyponyms), and the emotional repertoire. Given this model, we may empirically examine Perslovsky’s hypothesis concerning the delicate balance between synthesis and differentiation. Testing this hypothesis may in fact provide an answer to an idea insightfully introduced by Freud in “Civilization and Its Discontents”. In fact, the thesis raised by Freud can be easily translated to Perslovsky’s thesis!

The second important promise of the paper, concerns the tipping-point where the gain of differentiating the conceptual/symbolic/emotional realms may turn into a catastrophic loss. This point has been raised in fact by Freud, but Perslovsky’s ideas may provide us with tools for studying it. For instance, it is well-known that patients who are rational, intelligent and “psychologically minded” might be the most resistant to change during psychotherapy. Perslovsky may explain why and even provide measures for the potential trajectory of a psychotherapeutic change (or a coming catastrophe) at the individual and one may argue that even at the cultural level of analysis.                           

I'm studying the interface of language and thought

This is a very interesting, thought provoking article. I especially appreciate a multifaceted approach of the author to a very complex subject of the article that is attacked in this article from many directions. Indeed, it considers neural mechanisms as well as their mathematical models: the knowledge instinct, the language instinct, the dual model connecting language and cognition, dynamic logic, neural modeling fields. It is reflected in the broad scope of the literature of the article that is unusually and rewardingly broad. It is very interesting how Perlovsky applies his theory of the Knowledge Instinct and neuro-mathematical theories of interaction between language and cognition to the subject of the Language, Emotions, and Cultures.

I have a long standing interest in a subject and in research on the emotions in general.